What the World Needs Now?

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In late 1999, tens of thousands of people filled the streets of Seattle in one of the most visible manifestations of civil society in recent decades. They had gathered to show their opposition to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the broader forces of economic integration that it represents. The WTO, which was meeting to set an agenda for a proposed new round of global trade negotiations, found itself under scrutiny as never before. For several days, television news shows around the world displayed protesters being gassed and arrested by the hundreds. Although media reports portrayed the protesters as a combination of American labor unionists who wanted to protect their jobs at the expense of Third World workers and hippies left over from the 1960s, in fact the protesters represented a broad and to some degree transnational coalition of concerns. They objected not only to the WTO’s ability to override domestic environmental legislation but also to the very nature of the processes by which governments and corporations are fostering economic integration.

This is not the first time such groups have inserted themselves into global decision making, for good or ill. In recent decades, such stories have filled newspapers and scholarly journals alike.

- Every year, an international nongovernmental organization called Transparency International releases an index ranking the world’s countries on how corrupt they are perceived to be.
Although Transparency International only came into existence in 1993, it has galvanized a global movement against corruption.

• Almost since the dawn of the nuclear age, scores of activist groups have campaigned vigorously for a ban on nuclear testing. They argued that a test ban, more than any other measure, could bring nuclear arms races and the spread of nuclear weapons to a screeching halt. In 1996, they got their way when 136 countries signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

• For much of the twentieth century, countries around the world have constructed large dams on their rivers to create water supplies and electrical power. But in the past decade, would-be dam builders have found themselves in the crosshairs of a transnational movement protesting the environmental and human costs of these massive projects. Now, governments, the private sector, and transnational civil society have come together to create a World Commission on Dams, potentially setting a precedent for a new style of global problem solving.

• When an obscure guerrilla movement known as the Zapatistas took over four towns in the southern province of Chiapas in 1994, the Mexican government started to respond with force. When nongovernmental activists elsewhere (particularly in the United States) protested, Mexico put its troops on hold.

• In December 1997, 122 countries signed an international treaty to ban land mines, despite the vehement objections of the world’s most powerful governments. Standing beside the government delegates were representatives of some 300 nongovernmental organizations, members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, without whom the treaty would not exist.

• At the end of the 1990s, former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet found himself facing international legal charges based on his alleged violations of human rights in Chile. Nike
found that its bottom line suffered dramatically when it was accused of violating the rights of its workers in poor countries. The new standards by which heads of governments and corporations alike are being judged originated and spread due to the determined efforts of a broad network of nongovernmental groups around the world.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), informal associations, and loose coalitions are forming a vast number of connections across national borders and inserting themselves into a wide range of decision-making processes on issues from international security to human rights to the environment. But how significant is this flurry of apparent activity? Is transnational civil society becoming a permanent and powerful contributor to solving the world’s problems? And should global problem solving be left to a loose agglomeration of unelected activists?

These questions matter. Transnational civil society is a piece—an increasingly important piece—of the larger problem of global governance. Although the state system that has governed the world for centuries is neither divinely ordained nor easily swept away, in many ways that system is not well suited to addressing the world’s growing agenda of border-crossing problems. Even when governments find that their national interests coincide with broad global interests, political will is often hard to muster in the face of dangers that are incremental and long term, and most of the transnational threats to human well-being arise cumulatively rather than as acute crises. Even if states are able to bestir themselves, the transnational agenda is so complex and multifaceted that multiple sources of information and multiple points of intervention are needed. The sheer number of regimes and agreements needed to cope with the wide range of problems demanding governance is overwhelming the resources available to states, which in any case face increasing domestic demands.

And the transnational agenda is becoming more urgent. Thanks to the information revolution, the growing integration of national economies, and the rapidly increasing number of people in the world, human activity is less constrained than ever by national borders. People travel, migrate, communicate, and trade in ever-growing numbers, and the sheer number of economically active people is putting heavy stress on the environmental infrastructure on which everyone depends.
All that integration across borders has important benefits—greater freedom of choice, enhanced economic efficiency—but it also creates (or makes people aware of) problems that threaten human well-being. Such threats include everything from the difficulty of regulating internationally mobile capital to the danger of global environmental change to the corruption of governments and societies around the world. And even when the problems take place squarely within national territories, as in the case of human rights violations or the construction of dams that may devastate local ecosystems and populations, the solutions often draw broadly on the international community.

In short, the world badly needs someone to act as the “global conscience,” to represent broad public interests that do not readily fall under the purview of individual territorial states or that states have shown themselves wont to ignore. This book sets out to determine whether transnational civil society can, and should, fill the gap between the supply of and the need for global problem solving. Will, and should, transnational civil society play a greatly expanded role in the ever-expanding set of global issues?

To date, a large and growing literature has not made clear whether transnational civil society can provide an appropriate and effective instrument across the board, or whether in the end it will prove to be sound and fury signifying nothing. The literature largely concentrates on other questions. Much of it examines civil society one country at a time or draws comparisons across countries about the status of national civil societies. Relatively few analysts have looked at the networks linking civil society organizations across territorial boundaries, and most of these have examined just one case at a time. Very few studies have compared the various transnational civil society networks to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of this emerging form of transnational collective action. And only a handful have looked systematically at what, if anything, transnational civil society should do—at whether, and under what conditions, it is desirable for transnational civil society to play a significant part in making the decisions that shape the future for all of us. (The annotated bibliography in this book lists some of the relevant literature.) This gap badly needs to be filled. Anecdotes and isolated cases cannot answer fundamental questions about the significance, sustainability, and desirability of transnational civil society.

This book sets out to fill the gap by comparing six stories. The stories
are quite diverse—indeed, they were selected to cover a wide range of issues, to discover what commonalities might lurk beneath the surface. For the most part, they were chosen because at first glance they seem to be success stories. By teasing out what factors might account for success, or at least prominence, it is possible to move on to investigate whether those factors are widely shared. All the cases address the same three basic questions: How powerful is transnational civil society? How sustainable is its influence? How desirable is that influence?

The first case is in many ways the simplest. It is the story of the transnational network to curb corruption, a network that arose with astonishing rapidity in the 1990s to force corruption onto the international agenda. Unlike most cases of transnational civil society, this “network” consists primarily of a single international nongovernmental organization (INGO), Transparency International. Transparency International has created effective links with international organizations and national governments and has systematically cultivated the establishment of national chapters in scores of countries. But the basic story is about what a single man with a powerful idea at the right moment can accomplish through transnational nongovernmental means. Fredrik Galtung, the first professional staff member hired by Transparency International, brings us an insider’s account of this remarkable organization.

Rebecca Johnson’s chapter addresses a more diverse, and divided, network: the array of groups that campaign for nuclear arms control. As she shows, this motley crew uses very different strategies, from Greenpeace’s direct action to the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Nonproliferation’s behind-the-scenes meetings of government officials and nongovernmental experts. On occasion, members of the network have found themselves sharply at odds with one another over both tactics and goals. Yet the groups share a common dedication to reducing the risk of nuclear war, and their disparate approaches have proved complementary. Most strikingly, the chapter makes clear that without the active participation of transnational civil society, such fundamental nuclear arms control accords as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the permanent extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty would never have been signed.

Sanjeev Khagram tells a story that in many ways is the mirror image of Transparency International’s top-down approach. In his chapter on
the gradual emergence of a global network opposing the construction of large dams, Khagram identifies the origin of the network in multiple national civil society campaigns. These campaigns emerged not only in North America and Western Europe but also in Brazil, India, Indonesia, China, and a host of other developing countries. The frequent complaint against transnational civil society—that it overwhelmingly represents the concerns of Northerners who have the time and resources to apply to civil society organizing, rather than the concerns of people in poor countries—clearly does not apply in this case.

Chetan Kumar looks at one of the most controversial of transnational civil society roles: the targeting of specific governments with the aim of changing not just the policies but the very nature of those governments. In case studies on the Zapatista movement in Mexico and the campaign to restore President Aristide to power in Haiti, Kumar grapples with profound questions about the morality and practicality of transnational nongovernmental efforts to influence domestic processes of democratization.

Motoko Mekata recounts the odyssey of perhaps the best known of the recent transnational civil society campaigns: the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. In addition to providing a comprehensive account of the transnational network’s activities and impacts, she shows the extent to which the loosely coordinated campaign depended on the quite independent activities of national-level civil society. She provides a particularly detailed insider’s account of the Japanese national campaign, which more than most depended for its success on its transnational counterparts.

In the final case study, Thomas Risse explains the complex processes by which transnational civil society has transformed attitudes toward human rights in the second half of the twentieth century. He elucidates the impact transnational civil society has had on setting global human rights standards and changing governmental behavior. And he raises major questions about the future of this large and seemingly well-entrenched sector of transnational civil society.

These quite diverse stories are all variations on a common theme: efforts to solve problems that span borders in the absence of border-spanning governments. This introductory chapter provides a common framework of definitions, questions, and context. Chapter 8 returns to those questions to see what answers have emerged.
The Nature of the Beast

At first glance, it seems odd that transnational civil society should exist at all, much less be able to sway mighty governments and rich corporations. Why should people in disparate parts of the world devote significant amounts of time and energy, for little or no pay, to collaborations with groups with whom they share neither history nor culture? These networks are unlike the other major collectivities in the world. States occupy clearly defined physical territories with the coercive power to extract resources from those territories and their inhabitants, enjoy legal recognition from other states, and can call on powerful sentiments of patriotism to cement the loyalties of their citizens. The various subsidiaries of transnational corporations are tied together by common economic interests and legal obligations.

By contrast, transnational civil society networks—the emerging third force in global politics—tend to aim for broader goals based on their conceptions of what constitutes the public good. They are bound together more by shared values than by self-interest. The values the networks espouse vary tremendously. They range from beliefs in the rights of animals to religious beliefs to beliefs about the inherent superiority of some ethnic groups over others. Some of these values are widely held. Others, particularly the racist views reflected in the hate groups, are repugnant indeed.

We use the somewhat ungainly term “transnational civil society” in preference to other frequently heard lingo (such as “global civil society”) to emphasize both the border-crossing nature of the links and the fact that rarely are these ties truly global, in the sense of involving groups and individuals from every part of the world. The Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa in particular are severely underrepresented in transnational nongovernmental coalitions, other than those that address strictly regional and developmental concerns.

The definition of transnational civil society comes in three parts. First, like all civil society, it includes only groups that are not governments or profit-seeking private entities. Second, it is transnational—that is, it involves linkages across national borders. Third, as the case studies show, it takes a variety of forms. Sometimes it takes the form of a single INGO with individual members or chapters in several countries,
as in the case of Transparency International. In other cases, transnational civil society consists of more informal border-crossing coalitions of organizations and associations, such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.

The coalitions overlap with the rapidly growing set of nongovernmental service providers—such as CARE or Médecins sans frontières—that are increasingly familiar from the extensive news coverage of their role in humanitarian disaster relief efforts as well as development projects in poor countries. These service providers have benefited enormously from the increasing tendency of governments and intergovernmental organizations to channel relief and development funds through NGOs rather than to national or local governments. Although there is overlap between the ranks of the nongovernmental service providers, newly flush with government funds, and the members of the advocacy coalitions, the two are not identical, and the fortunes of the latter do not depend on the continued government-provided resources of the former.

The Long Tradition

Although most of the literature on the subject dates from the 1990s, transnational civil society has played a role in global affairs for centuries. Indeed, it may be as old as religion. As one author points out: “Religious communities are among the oldest of the transnational: Sufi orders, Catholic missionaries, Buddhist monks carried word and praxis across vast spaces before those places become nation states or even states. Such religious peripatetics were versions of civil society.”

And religious organizations provided the impetus behind the first modern transnational policy campaign: the nineteenth-century campaign to end slavery. Substantial evidence now exists that slavery remained economically viable in most of the places where it was abolished. The practice of slavery ended not because slaveholders found it unprofitable but because growing Protestant movements (especially Quaker, Methodist, and Baptist) found it morally reprehensible, persuaded their religious brethren elsewhere of the cause, and in time enlisted the support of the British government, which used its dominant naval power to constrict trade to slaveholding countries. NGOs dedicated to ending the slave trade date to 1775, with the establishment of
the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery, followed a decade later by the British Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade and the French Société des Amis des Noirs. The links among the movements solidified in 1839 with the establishment of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, in one commentator’s view, “the first transnational moral entrepreneur—religious movements aside—to play a significant role in world politics.”

Slavery was not the only issue to engage the nascent transnational civil society in the 1800s and early 1900s. Peace groups based in Europe and America lobbied at various international peace conferences. Governments began to use nongovernmental technical experts as delegates to international conferences. A variety of civil society associations formed around trade issues. The International Committee of the Red Cross was formed, the first step in what became the transnational Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Such groups as the Institut de Droit International and the International Law Association, both formed in 1873, contributed substantially to the development of international law.

Over the course of the twentieth century (with the exception of the periods covering the two world wars), the rate at which NGOs formed steadily grew. These numbers do not tell the full story of the growth of transnational civil society—they include only formally constituted organizations with members and activities in more than one country. But their numbers do reflect a general trend. By the turn of the century, the rate of formation was about ten a year, although nearly as many dissolved themselves every year. The number increased until World War I, fell to nearly nothing during the war years, then jumped again to about forty a year until war clouds again darkened the horizon. Although only a handful were created during the Second World War, immediately afterward the number jumped to unprecedented levels, starting at about a hundred new international associations a year and increasing ever since, with perhaps only ten to twenty dissolving each year. In other words, formal, transnational NGOs have been accumulating at an unprecedented and increasing rate for fifty years. The Union of International Associations now lists over 15,000 transnationally oriented NGOs. And the growth in informal transnational coalitions and linkages of all sorts is, if anything, outpacing the increase in formal organizations.

Now, coalitions that claim to speak for broad regional and global public interests abound. Hardly an international issue can be found
that lacks at least a rudimentary transnational network, and many are highly developed. The Climate Action Network, a 269-organization alliance of national and regional environmentalist nodes, has coalesced around the climate change negotiations. Women’s groups have taken advantage of a series of large United Nations conferences to form a thick weave of interconnections. In 1998, some 600 NGOs from around the world linked to put an end to negotiations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. One of the larger networks active in the peace and conflict arena, the Hague Appeal for Peace, held a conference in May 1999 that drew some 10,000 activists, who used the occasion to launch several new campaigns. With all the potential case studies, this could easily have been a very long book indeed.

How Do They Do It?

Standard international relations thinking assumes a hierarchy among the instruments of power: military force ranks highest, then economic resources, then—far down the list, if mentioned at all—such “soft” instruments as moral authority or the power of persuasion. The three types of international actors—states, the private sector, and civil society—vary greatly in their ability to use these instruments. Governments have coercive power, thanks to their control of military forces and the police, and they command economic resources because of their ability to tax. They can, and often do, use control over information to persuade or bamboozle other states, firms, and citizens. Firms lack coercive power but enjoy sometimes substantial economic resources, enabling them to influence governments and the public through everything from campaign contributions to bribes to their ability to provide jobs. And, of course, firms can devote some of their resources to advertising, usually to sell products, but sometimes to sell their views on issues. Civil society groups occasionally command economic resources, but these are usually very limited. By and large, they must rely on softer instruments of power, such as moral authority or the ability to shape how others see their own interests.

In the chapters that follow, the authors show how transnational civil society coalitions have attempted to shape the evolution of inter-
national norms—that is, standards about how governments, corporations, and other groups ought to behave. Some of these norms are eventually explicitly codified as treaties, such as many of the human rights standards, the nuclear arms control treaties, the new OECD anti-bribery convention, or the land-mine treaty. Others may not become treaties but are still widely shared standards of behavior, as is the case for emerging norms about how governments and intergovernmental organizations should treat people who may be displaced by the construction of big dams.

Civil society tries to shape these norms in two ways: directly, by persuading policy makers and business leaders to change their minds about what is the right thing to do—that is, what goal should be pursued—or indirectly, by altering the public’s perception of what governments and businesses should be doing. When public pressure is generated, politicians act to please their constituents and businesses must respond to keep investors and consumers happy. Civil society can confer legitimacy on a decision or institution (such as an “eco-label” that gives an environmental seal of approval). It can also threaten to go public with information that is embarrassing or would generate public backlash—a kind of coercion, but one that depends entirely on the ability to persuade the public.

Often, it is nearly impossible to tease out which is driving policy—whether governments and businesses change their policies because of a genuine change of heart or because of a change of calculation about what will look good to the public. Either way, transnational civil society exercises influence through its ability to make someone, policy makers or publics, listen and act. The currency of its power is not force, but credible information and moral authority.

**Posing the Questions**

This examination of transnational civil society provides more than a set of interesting stories. It provides examples of the variety of governance mechanisms that are emerging to deal with issues with which the nation-state system by itself may be ill equipped to cope.

But the emergence of these mechanisms raises a set of profound
questions. How powerful are the transnational networks? Will the trends that hold them together and provide them with power continue? Are the successes of transnational civil society in recent years the result of temporary global upheavals occasioned by, for example, the end of the Cold War, or is the nature of international power truly changing? And most important, what role should transnational civil society play as the world struggles to cope with the new global agenda?

The next six chapters provide evidence in detailed case studies of the strength of, and limits to, transnational civil society. Only when there is some basis for evaluating the role of transnational civil society can we have a useful discussion of what that role should be. And opening up a meaningful and detailed debate on that question of “should” is the purpose of this book. Just as societies and their governments have been struggling with the question of what role domestic civil society should have in decision making, the world as a whole must now grapple with the question of the appropriate role of transnational civil society. As globalization proceeds, it will stimulate more transnational civil society formation. And that, in turn, will influence how globalization proceeds. So far, the debate on the role of transnational civil society has been confined largely to polemical broadsides and scholarly journals. It is now time for a broader debate.

Notes


2. There is a vast literature of single-issue case studies. A useful bibliography that includes many types of movements is Sidney Tarrow and Melanie Acostavalle,


5. Some cross-border activism is purely self-interested. Many commentators waspishly noted that the labor union leaders demonstrating in Seattle against the WTO showed little concern for working conditions overseas until the removal of trade barriers threatened to allow a flood of cheap imports made by low-paid workers. But such barbs too easily dismiss the vast army of social activists with no discernible selfish interests at stake. Many transnational civil society connections represent more mundane pursuits, such as the many cross-border professional societies and business associations, but such organizations are not the focus of this book. Here we are examining the value-driven organizations and networks.

6. A private monitoring group called Hatewatch monitors the on-line activities of hate groups, which are forming growing transnational connections. See www.hatewatch.org. Another unpleasant set of transnational actors is often incorrectly grouped with transnational civil society: drug traffickers and other ele-
ments of global organized crime. These networks, however, are not civil society
groups as this book uses the term. They are pursuing profits, not moral causes.

7. Defining civil society is itself something of a cottage industry. For a useful review
of the definitional literature, see Adil Najam, “Understanding the Third Sector:
Revisiting the Prince, the Merchant, and the Citizen,” Nonprofit Management
and Leadership 7, no. 2 (winter 1996): 203–19. See also Chris Hann and Elizabeth
Dunn, Civil Society: Challenging Western Models (New York: Routledge, 1996);
Louis D. Hunt, “Civil Society and the Idea of a Commercial Republic,” in The Re-
vival of Civil Society, ed. Michael G. Schecter (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999),
pp. 11–37.

8. Several of the works described in the annotated bibliography discuss this ten-
dency, known as the New Policy Agenda, and its implications. See, for example,
the various works by Michael Edwards.

tional Religion and Failing States, ed. S. H. Rudolph and J. Piscatori (Boulder, Colo.:

10. Presentation by Carl Kaysen at the UCLA Conference on Norms and Interna-

11. Charnovitz, “Two Centuries of Participation.”

12. Betty Fladeland, Men and Brothers: Anglo-American Antislavery Cooperation

13. For short accounts of four early transnational networks, see Keck and Sikkink,
Activists Beyond Borders, chap. 2.


15. The information in this paragraph is taken from John Boli and George M.
Thomas, “World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-

16. Union of International Associations, “International Organizations by Type
(Table 1),” in Yearbook of International Organizations. www.uia.org/uiastats/
stybv196.htm.

17. For information, see www.climatenetwork.org.

18. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, chap. 5.


20. The new campaigns include the International Action Network on Small Arms,
at www.iansa.org; the International Criminal Court Global Ratification Cam-
paign, at cicc@ccicnow.org; and the Global Ban on Depleted Uranium Weapons,
which does not have an independent web site. For information on the Hague Ap-
peal for Peace itself, see www.haguepeace.org.

21. The annotated bibliography lists a number of such case studies, including sev-
eral edited volumes intended for academic audiences. Although these tend to
have a theoretical bent, the case studies are often accessible to a more general au-
dience.

22. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Power and Interdependence in the In-
formation Age,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (September–October 1998): 81–94, use
the term “soft power” in ways that overlap with its usage here. They discuss the
“soft power” available to the United States thanks to its dominance in informa-
tion technology. Like them, we see it as a kind of power that “depends largely on the persuasiveness of the free information that an actor seeks to transmit” (p. 86).  

23. A major academic debate is now under way over whether and how norms matter in international relations. Scholars used to focus primarily on military or economic levers of power, ignoring questions of how states and other actors would decide what they wanted to do with that power. A new school of thought called constructivism focuses on questions of how international actors “construct” their interests—that is, how they determine what they want to do and why those goals change. Constructivists point out that structures—those entities with the most military, economic, or other resources—have to interact with agents—people and institutions that shape international norms about what behavior is acceptable and what aspirations are legitimate. In the case of transnational networks of the type analyzed in this book, those agents are nongovernmental actors that are quite consciously attempting to bring about a global political change.
Em7 Am7 Em7 Am7 What the world needs now, is love, sweet love, F6 E7 sus4 E7 No, not just for some, but for everyone. Verse 1: Am9 Lord, we don't need another mountain, Gm7 C7 Fmaj7 There are mountains and hillsides e-nough to climb. Gm7 C7 Fmaj7 There are oceans and rivers e-nough to cross, Am7 D7 F/GE-nough to last, 'till the end of time. Chorus 1: Em7 Am7 Em7 Am7 What the world needs now, is love, sweet love, F6 G6 F6/G It's the only thing, that there's just too little of. Em7 Am7 Em7 Am7 What the world needs now, is love, sweet love, F6 E7 sus4 E7 No, not just for some, but for everyone. Verse 2