Edmund Spevack’s two deeply researched books cross and re-cross the Atlantic as they probe the influence of his two homelands upon one another, his first book on Charles Follen charting the transit of German conceptions of freedom into American reform, his second book in turn exploring American influence in the framing of West Germany’s Basic Law. His work makes a powerful case for the scholarly necessity of transcending national boundaries if we are to understand even what appear to be fundamentally national historical questions. His enduring and important contribution to the histories of both countries stands as its own best monument. But in tribute, on the occasion of this inaugural Edmund Spevack Memorial Lecture, I would like to extend his insight into yet another area of mutual influence: the role of German-speaking Roman Catholics in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America.

Just about the time that Charles Follen was, as Spevack shows us, arriving as a political émigré in the United States in late 1824, another educated, idealistic German, a 33-year-old Hanoverian named Friedrich Rese, also took his first steps onto American soil. Follen, scion of a Hessian professional family, was at 28 already a veteran of more than a decade’s struggle to realize liberal ideals of autonomous selfhood, democratic nationhood, and broader human emancipation in reactionary post-Napoleonic Europe. Rese, by contrast, was a Roman Catholic priest, once an impoverished tailor who fought as a cavalryman under Blücher at Waterloo and then trained for the priesthood in Rome, with two years of experience in the African missions under his belt before he responded to the personal appeal of Cincinnati’s first bishop to serve in his diocese. In America, Follen’s ideals carried him into lecturing on German philosophy at Harvard, into the religious liberalism of the Unitarian ministry, and ultimately into radical abolitionist reform. Rese, on the other hand, pioneered German services for Catholics in the Midwest, promoted lay and clerical German Catholic settlement in America, stimulated the founding of Vienna’s Leopoldine Society to support American missions, and went on to become Detroit’s first bishop. Hundreds of other young, educated German political refugees later followed the trail that Follen helped blaze,
finding refuge in America’s freedom but, like him, seeking also to reform and perfect it through philosophical speculation and political activism. Their complex role in the national crisis that finally ended slavery and reconstructed the American state has been well explored by scholars. Reuse similarly served as a pathbreaker for hundreds of other German immigrant clerics—and hundreds of thousands of German Catholic lay immigrants—over the course of the following century. History, however, remains comparatively silent on the significance of their Atlantic crossing. Yet it constitutes, I would like to suggest, an even more enduring instance of German influence upon America, and a problematic chapter in religion’s ongoing engagement with American public life.

Catholicism has long seemed like an embarrassing guest at the table of American historiography, best ignored in the hope that it will not make a disturbing fuss. Catholic historians in their marginalized historiographical ghetto were long concerned to prove that Catholics were good, or even better, Americans than everyone else. Mainstream historiography, if it took them at their word, could avoid having to come to terms with an anomalous religious system, escape the political minefield of appearing to blame Catholic victims for differences that led to discrimination, and dismiss America’s periodic outbursts of anti-Catholicism as irrational paranoia outside the national mainstream. American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville famously argued, turned even its Catholic citizens into good republicans, and by their refusal to engage the Catholic issue, American historians implicitly agreed. In Europe, too, Catholic historiography was long sealed off from mainstream historiographical concerns, with nineteenth-century Catholicism seemingly little more than a backward-looking footnote in a dominant narrative of modernizing secular progress. But this interpretive situation has undergone a dramatic transformation over the past several decades, as scholars have come to understand both the major revitalization that Catholicism experienced in nineteenth-century Europe, Germany included, and the significance of its corporatist, ultramontane resistance to the emerging liberal state.

This new scholarship on European Catholicism poses a real question for American history. Were American Catholics, roughly a quarter of the American population from the mid-nineteenth century onward, truly immune to these international trends? If immigrants, did they import their new forms of piety and new Roman sensibilities to the United States, and could such allegiances have seemed as troublesome to the emergent American state as they did to its European counterparts? It is beginning to be clear that this was indeed the case. A new Catholic historiography has shown that the new devotional style, and the hierarchical corporatist sense of social order and ultramontane orientation upon which it rested, became pervasive among American Catholics after the 1830s. This helps
explain the distinctive Catholic political behavior that analysts have long identified, and helps account for the force of American liberal opposition to Catholicism’s influence, as John McGreevey’s recent study persuasively demonstrates. 5 The power of that anti-Catholic opposition itself emerges dramatically in Philip Hamburger’s recent documentation of the central role of anti-Catholicism in the shaping of the American doctrine of the separation of church and state. 6 Within this context, then, the German Catholic experience can provide an instructive case of just what was at stake in these nineteenth-century American culture wars.

Perhaps two million Roman Catholics migrated from German-speaking Europe to the United States during the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century era of mass migration. This figure is only the crudest of approximations. Gerald Shaughnessy’s widely quoted estimate that Catholics were a third of America’s roughly 5.5 million German immigrants during this period rests on simple extrapolation of Catholic proportions of the populations of the various German states to state proportions of the total German emigration. 7 Yet we know that Catholic areas within certain states—Prussia in particular—were overrepresented in the early decades of emigration, and underrepresented in others, like Bavaria. Similarly, Shaughnessy may have been over-optimistic in his insistence that the vast majority of emigrants from Catholic areas remained within the Catholic fold once in America. Also lost to the specifically German variant of American Catholicism were those German immigrants who chose to affiliate with English-speaking parishes.

Still, by 1870, almost a sixth of all American Catholics belonged to German-speaking parishes, and a third of all American priests were German. A century later, roughly the same proportion of American Catholics still acknowledged German descent. 8 By the end of the nineteenth century, there were more than 2,250 German-language Catholic parishes scattered across the northern United States, from the industrial cities of the northeast through the farming heartland of the Midwest to the Great Plains and the Pacific Northwest, with outliers as far south as Alabama and Texas. Roughly three-quarters of those parishes were concentrated in the five Midwestern archdioceses of Cincinnati, St. Louis, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Chicago, where German immigration coincided with the opening of the American frontier and where roughly a third of all Catholic parishes were German. The great majority of these German parishes were rural. Fewer than ten percent were in the sixteen large urban areas with six or more German parishes each, though those urban parishes were admittedly the largest ones. 9 When mapped, these German parishes form some fifty separate geographical clusters ranging in size from three, to thirty or forty, contiguous rural and associated urban parishes each.
Within the archipelago of these clustered colonies, German Catholic immigrants and their descendants long supported an elaborate institutional structure that paralleled both the secular German-American ethnic array and that of other Catholics. They developed a political culture at odds with that of other German Americans and a religious culture distinctive from that of other Catholics, nurturing a set of conservative, communal values that acquired significant influence within American public life. German Catholics formed a recognizable voting bloc as early as the 1850s, and remained one as late as 1970, when political analyst Kevin Phillips highlighted their role in the emergence of a national Republican majority and the new religious right.10 Well into the second half of the twentieth century, sociologists have demonstrated, Catholics of German origin still exhibited some of white America’s highest rates of fertility, rural residence, and religious endogamy, and, in rural areas, some of its lowest average levels of education.11 Even today, when the German character of most urban parishes has long since dissipated, many of the rural German Catholic colonies have consolidated and extended their dominance of the local agricultural landscape, and their German Catholic roots are as recognizable in the graphic anti-abortion signs that line their highways as in the names in their phonebooks and the well-kept streets and businesses of their church-centered communities.

The distinctiveness and relative endurance of this ethno-religious subculture emerged from the immigrant encounter of a revitalized German Catholicism with an American republic undergoing its own process of religio-cultural redefinition. Four factors, I would like to suggest, played a crucial role in forming the German Catholic subculture: first, the relative success by the mid-1840s of German-American efforts to confessionalize the Catholic migration and retain immigrants within Catholic auspices; second, the diaspora consciousness—the sense of still being part of a larger, German-rooted whole—that was cultivated through continuing ties to homeland Catholicism; third, the practical political obstacles that Germans, along with other Catholics, presented to an America in the throes of evangelical self-redefinition; and fourth, the Kulturkampf mentality and separatist milieu formation that resulted.12 Let me briefly consider each of these in turn.

First, then, the confessionalization of transatlantic migration. In a confessional age, to borrow Olaf Blaschke’s concept, it should not seem remarkable that emigration, like so many other aspects of life, was also confessionalized.13 This was not as strongly the case to begin with. To be sure, British colonial authorities ensured that eighteenth-century German migration to America was overwhelmingly Protestant. But occasional Catholics inevitably arrived with Protestant relatives and friends, laying the basis for a rapid growth in Catholic proportions as the momentum for
Mass migration began to build in the 1820s and 1830s. Much of the Catholic character of this growing immigration can be attributed to the natural consequences of chain migration, as trailblazers attracted others whom they knew, as well as to well-known disparities within German society that found Catholics disproportionately represented among those with the strongest economic motives to emigrate.14

But there were also suggestive early efforts to lend the migration an explicitly Catholic focus. As early as the mid-eighteenth century, German Jesuit missionaries encouraged scattered German Catholics to concentrate in two rural Pennsylvania settlements, where they could be provided more efficiently with religious services. Immediately after the Revolution, Germans in Philadelphia and Baltimore began a painful process of separating from Irish coreligionists into German-language parishes of their own. Differences in devotional practice as well as language seem to have been responsible. In 1799, Dimitri Gallitzin, a Russian-Westphalian aristocrat who in 1795 became the first American-trained priest ordained in the United States, revived the Jesuit strategy of concentrated Catholic settlement when he recruited Pennsylvania and Maryland German and Irish pioneers to form a self-consciously Catholic colony in Pennsylvania’s western wilderness, setting a precedent that other westward-moving German Catholics increasingly sought to replicate.15 By 1824 there were enough German Catholics in the new western diocese of Cincinnati in Ohio that its Maryland-born bishop, traveling in Europe, sought German-speaking priests to serve them. He recruited first the Hanoverian Frederick Rese, who would become the first bishop of Detroit in 1833, and then two Swiss, Martin Kundig and John Martin Henni, the latter of whom would become Milwaukee’s first bishop in 1844. In Cincinnati beginning in the late 1820s, these immigrant priests and their lay allies effectively invented the basic institutional array that would characterize German Catholicism in America. This included the elaborate institutional parish complete with school, choir, and mutual benefit societies and sodalities for every age and gender group, soon also the German Catholic orphanage, hospital, cemetery, as well as the first German-language Catholic newspaper in the United States in 1837, explicitly aimed at a national rather than purely local readership. It also involved the recruitment of German-speaking religious orders—Austrian Redemptorists in 1832, Swiss Sanguinists in 1843, Bavarian Benedictines in 1844—and the establishment of a German-language seminary in 1846. As early as 1827, Rese published in Germany the first pamphlet explicitly promoting America as a site for Catholic settlement—a new Catholic “Zion,” Henni would call it in an 1836 pamphlet—and at least by the late 1820s, Germany’s infant Catholic press was publishing reports from their coreligionists in America.16 The Cincinnatians also helped stimulate the for-
mation of societies to support American missions in Vienna in 1827 and Munich in 1838, which sent clergy and money to America and diffused news of American opportunities to a broad Catholic public in Germany through their published reports. Soon each German priest in America became a point of information and practical aid tied into an international emigration network, each parish priest in Germany a potential point of access. Thus as German interest in emigration intensified in the 1830s, Catholic Germany was well on its way to developing what might be termed an emigration system of its own.

Might religion itself, then, have motivated emigration? We are unaccustomed to thinking of nineteenth-century Catholicism in these terms. But given the embattled state of Catholicism in Europe, emigration might well have offered a promise of sanctuary for the pious, a place to build a more godly world anew. The great central valley of America, Henni had prophesied in 1836, was destined to become “the arena of most effective working and flourishing of our holy religion.” German church authorities, less optimistic than their American counterparts, often sought to stem the tide of emigration with discouraging reports of American conditions, and the religious utopianism that brought Ambrose Oschwald and his 113 Badenese disciples to the Wisconsin wilderness in 1854 was clearly exceptional. Religion “caused” little Catholic emigration in this immediate sense. But it surely shaped how opportunities were perceived, influenced the choice of those to whom emigrants turned for leadership and advice, and directly shaped patterns of settlement and community formation.

The best evidence for the success of the effort to confessionalize the migration within overtly Catholic channels is the growing elaboration of what has to be understood as a German Catholic settlement system. During the 1830s, German priests like Peter Henry Lemcke in western Pennsylvania and Joseph Ferneding in Indiana sought to follow Gallitzen’s example by drawing scattered Catholics into clustered colonies. Lay Catholics in Europe also began to form emigration colonies before leaving Germany, like the Westphalians and Bavarians who settled in Missouri, Eifelers in southern Michigan, and Hanoverians in Ohio. Such colonies, and the entrepôt cities that fed them, quickly acquired additional settlers directed to them by Catholic authorities to whom newcomers turned for advice, and by articles on new settlements that became a staple of America’s widely circulated German Catholic press. By the late 1840s, Midwestern bishops in Dubuque, Milwaukee, and St. Paul were explicitly luring German Catholic settlers to their dioceses, and the scattered colonies of the earlier period soon gave way to broad bands of rural German Catholic settlement. Proliferating Benedictine monasteries proved particularly potent nodes of these expansive new frontier concen-
tations. As the second and third American generations came of age and needed additional land, the same process of ever-expanding colonization continued well into the twentieth century. Catholicism, then, was not merely part of the immigrants’ cultural baggage; it was the vessel in which many made their voyage to a new-world life.

Those who chose to settle under the auspices of the Church were in a sense self-selected by their adherence to its values, which would be reinforced in the clustered settlements through churches, schools, institutions, and social pressure. But—and this is the second factor I want to explore—America’s German Catholicism was never just a simple construct of immigrant memory and American adaptation. It was a true diaspora culture, retaining continuing ties to the Catholic homeland and taking its cues from German rhythms as much as from those of America. For one thing, ongoing chain migration and family correspondence kept many personal transatlantic ties alive well into the third decade of the twentieth century and beyond, as relief efforts after both World Wars testify. For another, America’s German Catholic press provided constant, informed, and extensive coverage of events, controversies, and trends in Catholic Germany, and interpreted American events in their light.

Even more significant was the direct leadership Catholic Germany long provided. Not until the early twentieth century did German America begin to be self-sufficient in its Catholic clergy. Barely 50 German-speaking priests served the nation’s estimated 300,000 German Catholics in 1843. By 1869, there were a total of 1,169 German-speaking priests in the United States, of whom only 39 were known to be American-born; these German-speaking priests accounted for about 35 percent of all American priests at the time. The heavy clerical immigration at the height of the Prussian *Kulturkampf* helped push the number of German clerics to 2,067 by 1881, though the increase of the American-born proportion to 18 percent also signified a beginning transition to a homegrown clergy. Importantly, the largest single group, 30 percent of the total, came from Westphalian and Hanoverian dioceses, many of them *Kulturkampf* refugees carrying the passions of embattled German Catholicity directly into American pulpits and confessionals. Similarly, while America’s German seminaries began turning out male lay teacher-organists for German Catholic parishes as early as the late 1840s, immigrants trained in Germany as Kirchenwöchter long remained in high demand in American parishes. German sisterhoods, which began arriving in the 1840s, seem to have attracted recruits far more quickly from German America than did the priesthood.

This long-lasting religious immigration meant that America’s German Catholicism was never purely a folk culture, a set of habits of the heart. It was a consciously imported, cultivated, evolving, and, like its
German parent, increasingly ultramontane intellectual and spiritual tradition, accompanied by a set of institutional strategies often derived from homeland example. Certainly Catholic Germans imported a traditional folk repertoire of Baroque piety. The annual parish fund-raising fair became the functional equivalent of the old country Kirmes, votive chapels sprouted along country lanes, and miraculous occurrences ensured occasions for multi-parish pilgrimage to local shrines. Much to the dismay of American bishops, Germans turned tax-supported rural public schools into parish schools on the old country model as soon as they dominated local electorates, and retained German customs of administering parish property through a lay Kirchenrat rather than by the pastor alone. But many of the specific devotions, and the proliferation of cradle-to-grave Church-sponsored societies and sodalities, were not so much traditional as products of the nineteenth-century Catholic revival, and it remains unclear how much was American innovation and how much was direct copying of new German trends.

What is clear, however, is the extent to which national German Catholic organization in America depended on the German example for both forms and timing. America’s weekly German Catholic press emerged in the late 1830s only a few years after its German models. America’s national association of lay German Catholic societies was founded in 1855, seven years after the first national convention of Catholic associations in Germany and coincident with the beginning of national-level organization among secular German Americans. American branches of the Kolping Society sprang up in 1856, and the Cecilian Society for music reform in 1873. In the 1880s, in the wake of Kulturkampf-influenced organization in Germany, an American branch of the St. Raphael Society was founded, rapidly followed by a national association of German-American priests, the first national Katholikentag, and national associations for the German-Catholic press, for young men, for Catholic sub-groups like Luxembourgers, and for the support of poor German-American mission parishes.

Diasporic connections, then, ensured that America’s German-speaking Catholics would continue to view American events through German-tinted Catholic lenses, and gave them ready access to German-molded arguments and organizational forms. But American circumstances—my third point of discussion—provided the occasion for their need. It can be (and has been) argued that the most characteristic structures of German Catholic America—the rural colony, the institutional parish, the transplanted clergy, and the distinctive piety—were simply the natural responses of a revitalized romantic Catholicism to the needs of an immigrating, largely peasant population, and constituted no threat to America and its public culture.
Certainly Henni himself, when he first took up his editorial pen in 1837, saw the main task of the “worldly” side of his newspaper to be a double one: defending the Catholic as a model republican citizen, and telling his readers what they needed to know to fulfill the duties of citizenship. He insisted on his own political nonpartisanship, and consistently held up Catholic heroes like Columbus, Lafayette, and Declaration of Independence signer Charles Carroll of Carrollton to claim charter status for Catholics as Americans. He insisted that Catholicism, with its emphasis on duty, morality, and obedience to constituted authority, was compatible with any governmental form, including republicanism. In a position unusual for an American Catholic cleric, he even took a stand against slavery, advocating its abolition through gradual means consistent with public order. But the seeds of the German Catholic quarrel with America were also present in his constant insistence that community must come before self, that freedom should never be permitted to degenerate into insolence or anarchy, and in the convolutions he went through to justify religiously the enjoyment of alcohol and the convivial German Sunday cherished by his flock.26

There was the nub of the problem. Catholic immigrants were encountering an America in the throes of its own religious revival, a revival that was creating what Mark Noll has termed a new American synthesis compounded of evangelical Protestant religion, republican ideology, and commonsense moral reasoning. Not only did this redefinition of America’s religious identity and the “extraconstitutional religious establishment” (the term is William Hutchinson’s) that it stimulated leave little room for Catholic Americans, with their very different social and moral conceptions: It also brought direct day-to-day political conflict over issues like temperance, Sabbatarianism, public education, and slavery.27 Thus by the 1840s, America’s anti-papist British heritage took on sharper political form, not only in revulsion against the growing Irish and German presence, but also in response to real concerns for national salvation and for the problem of maintaining effective self-governance among a culturally heterogeneous citizenry.28

German Catholic voters only too readily equated such efforts with German state pressures on ultramontane Catholicism, and quickly became some of the staunchest members of the Democratic Party’s coalition against the evangelical reform agenda that emerged in the 1850s as the Republican Party. The same localism and anti-statism on which southern slaveholders drew to defend their ‘peculiar institution’ from federal attack seemed the best defense for the autonomy and distinctiveness of German Catholic communities. This political alliance with southern rebels meant that northern German Catholic communities faced acute federal pressure during the Civil War, and that efforts to bring church
schools under public control became a significant component of the Republicans’ postwar Reconstruction agenda.

Thus by the 1880s, America’s German Catholics were adopting not only Germany’s name for such state pressure—Kulturkampf—but also the milieu-building social and political tactics with which their cousins in the fatherland had responded. This is my fourth and final point. The fact that their opponents among the liberal German immigration were often radical Republicans only intensified the German Catholic retreat into a defensive localistic opposition that lasted until the 1930s, and whose traces remain evident in the anti-statism of the religious right today. They did their best to shape the Democratic Party into an American equivalent of Germany’s Center Party, and the American Federation of Labor into an anti-socialist reflection of Germany’s Catholic labor movement. Their retreat into their own milieu extended to reluctance to cooperate with fellow Germans even in opposing hated Prohibition, and to hesitance in sharing associational memberships with non-German Catholics. Indeed, German Catholic desire for cultural and administrative autonomy helped provoke one of the defining crises of later nineteenth-century American Catholicism, the so-called Americanism controversy, which, I have argued elsewhere, can only be understood if its roots in German milieu Catholicism are taken into account. The associational separatism constructed by America’s German Catholics would not long survive generational assimilation processes, the pressures of World War I, and the efforts of their own bishops and clergy to bring them into the orthodox American Catholic fortress. But their heritage of confessionalized rural settlement and ethnically exclusive milieu formation helped ensure the far longer endurance of their distinctive ethno-religious culture.29

Neither Charles Follen nor Frederic Rese lived happily ever after in America. The year 1833 was a turning point in their parallel lives. For Follen, it marked his entrance into the ranks of early organized anti-slavery. For Rese, it marked his elevation to the new bishopric of Detroit. But by 1837, as America sank into economic crisis, the costs for both were clear, measured for Follen in friends and positions lost, for Rese in a forced letter of resignation from his see under charges from his fellow American bishops of personal and official dereliction of the duties and dignities of his office. His ambition, his complicated efforts to finance his frontier see, and perhaps his Germanness in a church of English- and French-speaking bishops, probably lay at the heart of his problems. The pope initially exonerated him, but, irritated by his refusal to immediately return to Rome to answer charges of unauthorized European fund-raising (Rese was trying to save his Michigan speculations from financial collapse), removed him from the exercise of his office in 1840. He never returned to America, his undocumented wanderings finally ending in
madness and death in his home bishopric of Hildesheim in 1871. Follen’s early death in a steamboat accident came in 1840. His heritage lay in the example he set for the many freedom-seeking German refugees who followed him, and in the intellectual reputation that he bequeathed to them. Rese’s only monument may be the street that bears his name in his home town of Vienenburg, but the echoes of his efforts, and those of all his fellow Catholic immigrants from Germany, can still be perceived in American religion and public life today.

I have been able to present only a sketchy synopsis of a larger argument that still demands far more basic research if it is to be supported. My subject must not be over-inflated in significance: America’s German Catholic immigrants were always a minority within a minority. But, I would like to suggest in conclusion, they provide an instructive case study for the pervasiveness of nineteenth-century confessionalism. They raise questions for historians of Catholic Germany about the relationship between Catholic revival and emigration, and suggest the potential of international comparisons to illuminate issues like Catholic disadvantage or the roots of milieu formation. But most importantly in the context that I have sought to develop here, they suggest that international comparison can help clarify the logic of the emergent American state’s concern with Catholic religion, too often dismissed by American historians as either nativist paranoia or irrelevant distraction from more central issues of race. They represent an enduring corporatist dissenting tradition within American public life, its simultaneously conservative and progressive tensions best embodied, perhaps, in the contrasting political careers of the twentieth century’s two McCarthy’s, Joseph and Eugene, who, despite their Irish names, were raised in the small-town Midwest within the subculture of their German Catholic mothers. Frederic Rese may be forgotten today, yet his legacy has had as long and significant an afterlife as Follen’s, and merits similar scholarly attention.

Notes

1 Edmund Spevack, Charles Follen’s Search for Nationality and Freedom: Germany and America 1796–1840 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); Allied Control and German Freedom: American Political and Ideological Influences on the Framing of the West German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) (Münster: LIT, 2001).


3 For the historiography of American Catholics, see e.g. Philip Gleason, “The New Americanism in Catholic Historiography,” U.S. Catholic Historian 11 (1993): 1–18; Leslie Woodcock


16 Roger Fortin, Faith and Action: A History of the Archdiocese of Cincinnati 1821–1996 (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2002); Peter Leo Johnson, Crosier on the Frontier: A Life of John Martin Henni, Archbishop of Milwaukee (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1959). For German Catholic coverage of American co-religionists, see, for example, Der Katholik (Speyer), v. 8, no. 4 (1828), 186–202; v. 8, No. 7 (1828), 206–211; v. 8, no. 9 (1828), 78–84; v. 8, no. 8 (1828), xxxix–xliii.


18 Johann Martin Henni, Ein Blick in’s Thal des Ohio oder, Briefe über den Kampf und das Wiederaufleben der katholischen Kirche im fernen Westen der vereinigten Staaten Nordamerika’s (München, 1836).


23 These calculations are my own, derived from the listings in W. Bonenkamp and Joseph Jessing, Schematismus der deutschen und der deutsch-sprechenden Priester sowie der deutschen Katholiken-gemeinden in den Vereinigten Staaten Nord-Amerika’s (St. Louis: Herder, 1882).

24 For this culture in the German parishes of central Minnesota, see Kathleen Neils Conzen, Making Their Own America: Assimilation Theory and the German Peasant Pioneer, German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., Annual Lecture Series No. 3 (New York: Berg, 1990).


26 These conclusions rest on my reading of the first six years of Der Wahrheits Freund (Cincinnati), beginning with volume 1, number 1, July 20, 1837.


28 Kathleen Neils Conzen, “German Catholic Communalism and the American Civil War: Exploring the Dilemmas of Transatlantic Political Integration,” in Elisabeth Gläser and Hermann Wellenreuther, Bridging the Atlantic: The Question of American Exceptionalism in

29 Conzen, “Immigrant Religion,” develops this argument in significantly more detail; see also Barry, Catholic Church and German Americans; Gleason, Conservative Reformers; Rory T. Conley, Arthur Preuss, Journalist and Voice of German and Conservative Catholics in America, 1871–1934 (New York: Peter Lang, 1998); Jon Gjerde, The Minds of the West: Ethnocultural Evolution in the Rural Middle West, 1830–1917 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).
The story of Roman Catholicism in the nineteenth century is the story of immigration. Until about 1845, the Roman Catholic population of the United States was a small minority of mostly English Catholics, who were often quite socially accomplished. But when several years of devastating potato famine led millions of Irish Catholics to flee to the United States in the mid-1840s, the face of American Catholicism began to change drastically and permanently. In the space of fifty years, the Catholic Freud and the psychology of religion. Late nineteenth-century biblical criticism questioned the literal truth of the Bible. True. Liberal Protestants saw the progress of society as a sign of the coming of the kingdom of God. True. Which of the following was NOT characteristic of late nineteenth-century fundamentalist Protestantism? Irish Catholics who moved up economically in nineteenth-century American society were called: “Steam heat” Irish and “Lace curtain” Irish. The area where German Catholics settled was called the German Triangle which was bounded by these three cities: St. Louis, Milwaukee, and Cincinnati. German Catholics relied more on the initiative of church members than the leadership of their priests. True.